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1Abstract. Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta and Pattanaik [3] have presented a construction that
aggregates standard demand functions by a stochastic demand function, in such way that
the latter satis¯es the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference when the former ful¯l
Samuelson's weak axiom of revealed preference. We introduce a concept of stochastic
demand correspondences and generalize WASRP to this new setting. Also, we propose a
procedure to aggregate stochastic demand correspondences that (a) includes the previous
one by those authors, (b) aggregates the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference
(and thus stochastic substitutability when we started with tight stochastic demand func-
tions), and (c) produces a stochastically rational stochastic demand correspondence when
the primitive ones are stochastically rational. Interpretations of the model are provided
too. An analogous to the result that rationalizability of stochastic demand functions by
stochastic orderings implies WASRP holds for the correspondence setting. We also dis-
cuss the convenience of adopting a formal variation of the notion of being stochastically
rational that was proposed in the literature.
21 Introduction
This work originates with the disappointing fact that a representative consumer endowed
with the wealth of the group whose aggregate demand represents may fail to satisfy
Samuelson's weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) even though all the individual
consumers ful¯l it (Mas-Colell et al. [9, Example 4.C.1]). This results in procedural
di±culties when consistent predictions on aggregate behavior are to be performed, as
long as the standard analysis presumes WARP in the aggregate, being derived from the
preference maximization hypothesis.
A recent proposal to overcome such technical handicap appeals to stochastic demand
functions for representing aggregate behavior instead (cf. Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta and
Pattanaik [3]). Such stochastic functions are then requested to satisfy a certain weak
axiom of stochastic revealed preference (WASRP). This requirement had been introduced
in Bandyopadhyay et al. [2]. Then, [2, Proposition 3.5] proves that it is strictly weaker
than rationalizability by stochastic orderings. This fact accounts, at individual level, for
its justi¯cation as a sensible rationality property. Further, it addresses the reader to a
rationalizability problem to which Falmagne [8] and, afterwards, Barberµ a and Pattanaik
[5], gave answers. Also, Bandyopadhyay et al. [4] was devoted to show that such weak
axiom of stochastic revealed preference is equivalent to another restriction on stochastic
demand behavior that they called Stochastic Substitutability, for tight stochastic demand
functions. This latter achievement extends some fundamental results in the classical
demand theory.
In order to make that new aggregation proposal fully useful one needs to guarantee that
in suitable circumstances, the representative consumer has a certain stochastic demand
function that satis¯es WASRP. In Bandyopadhyay et al. [3] that is accomplished by
associating a signi¯cant stochastic demand function with a group of competitive consumers
displaying standard demand functions, which, provided that WARP holds for all the
individual consumers, satis¯es WASRP in turn. Explicitly, what is postulated is that a
¯ctitious representative consumer captures the groups' behavior in the following sense:
for any price-wealth situation, her stochastic demand function measures the proportion
of agents whose demanded bundle lies in each part of the corresponding budget set.
Our main aim is to complete the study considering these and other aggregability is-
sues with regard to aggregation of stochastic demand functions or correspondences. The
latter notion, that is intrinsically interesting because it permits to associate a (stochas-
tic) representative agent with any society whose members have multivalued demands,
will be motivated and introduced as a generalization of the concept of stochastic demand
function.
Particularly relevant is the analysis of the rationalizability problem. Let us recall
brie°y some key antecedents in the standard approach. What must be highlighted in the
¯rst place is that the standard aggregation procedure fails to keep stronger rationality
assumptions such as the Strong Axiom or representability (by preferences or utility func-
tions) as well. Consequently, some classical contributions had to narrow their focus to
individual demand functions that have rather restrictive structures in order to be able
to assure that the appropriate rationality postulate carries over to the aggregate. As
3for the representability issues, Chipman [6] and Eisenberg [7] come to mind. In a much
related line of inquiry, Shafer [10] is concerned with the Strong Axiom. After his work
we know that if some individual demand functions are homogeneous of degree one in
income and each of them satis¯es the budget equality and the strong axiom of revealed
preference, then their aggregate demand satis¯es (a strengthened version of) the strong
axiom too. Given these antecedents, it is not only noteworthy but also probably surprising
that the stochastic procedure of aggregation does perform well when it comes to keeping
rationality properties. To illustrate this characteristic before introducing the necessary
technicalities, we anticipate a particular statement of this achievement: the stochastic
representative agent of a society where everyone derived his/her demand function from
an ordering (complete or connected plus transitive) can be also explained as the result
of optimizing a stochastically rational behavior, although its standard aggregate demand
could be non-rationalizable by an ordering.
We have organized this work as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the concept of
stochastic demand correspondence. For these correspondences, we specify the appropri-
ate version of WASRP, that coincides with the previous formulation in the restricted
instance of stochastic demand functions. Afterwards, in Section 3 we justify that if a
number of (individual or representative) consumers display stochastic demand correspon-
dences that satisfy WASRP, then their aggregation by a certain sensible stochastic demand
correspondence satis¯es it too. Other aggregability issues of our construction will be put
forward. In particular, certain structural form of the stochastic aggregate of classical
demand functions that satisfy Walras' law plus the compensated law of demand will be
derived easily, which adds to the mentioned fact that their standard aggregate ful¯ls the
compensated law of demand too. Our proposal for aggregating stochastic demand has
di®erent readings. On the one hand, it permits to deal with individual consumers whose
choices were stochastic in the beginning, e.g. because they derive them from a probability
distribution over utility scales or just linear preference orderings (see Falmagne [8] and
Barberµ a and Pattanaik [5] for a more thorough exposition of this latter model). The mo-
tivating instance that Bandyopadhyay et al. analyzed, where all the initial agents have
a deterministic behavior, is encompassed in this case. On the other hand, it may permit
capturing in a single representative the choice behavior of a group of di®erent collectives,
each of whose demand behaviors were determined (or estimated, e.g. through samplings
or polls) by a representative stochastic consumer. Whatever the reading, the relevant issue
is that, under our construction, the corresponding (stochastic or not) weak axiom trans-
lates into WARSP of the stochastic aggregate. In Section 4 we shall remark that under
the appropriate rationalizability restriction, stochastic demand correspondences satisfy
WASRP, which highlights its role as a plausible rationality restriction on stochastic de-
mand behavior. A short discussion of the concepts of rationality in the stochastic setting,
together with possible variations on it, are explicited too. We also correct an inaccuracy in
a proof contained in a previous reference. The rationalizability properties that are carried
over to the aggregate stochastic demand correspondence are put forward in Section 5. A
concluding Section 6 will put an end to this contribution.
42 Stochastic demand correspondences and WASRP
The settings that we are going to consider will be modeled through the following common
axiomatics, as will be explained in Section 4. We assume henceforth that prices are
positive and incomes non-negative. Each consumer's consumption set is Rm
+. The next
de¯nitions are known.
Firstly, we focus on d (individual or not) stochastic demand function (SDF henceforth).
That is, d is a rule assigning, to every price-income situation (p;w), one ¯nitely additive
probability measure over the class of all subsets of the budget set B(p;w): cf. Bandyo-
padhyay et al. [3, De¯nition 2.1, Remark 2.2]. Thus, whenever A µ B(p;w), d(p;w)(A)
represents the probability that the agent's demanded bundle will lie in A under prices p
and income w. Any standard deterministic demand function d can be identi¯ed with a (de-
generate) SDF e d through the expression: e d(p;w)(A) = 1 when d(p;w) 2 A, e d(p;w)(A) = 0
otherwise, for each possible (p;w) -see also [4, De¯nition 2.2]. We shall use the shorthand
DDF as well.
We say that the stochastic demand function d satis¯es the weak axiom of stochastic
revealed preference (WASRP) if, for all price-income situations (p;w), (p0;w0), and for
every A µ B(p;w) \ B(p0;w0): d(p;w)(B(p;w) n B(p0;w0)) > d(p0;w0)(A) ¡ d(p;w)(A).
For the sake of the comparison, Remark 3.7 in [2] shows that a certain stochastic version
of WARP holds under WASRP. Namely: for all price-income situations (p;w), (p0;w0)
such that d(p;w)(B(p;w) \ B(p0;w0)) = 1, and for every A µ B(p;w) \ B(p0;w0):
d(p
0;w






0) n B(p;w)) (1)
Thus far, we have been concerned with the stochastic counterpart of demand functions
alone. However, demand correspondences are also relevant in economic theory and ab-
stract choice theory, and therefore must appeal to an appropriate stochastic version. We
propose the following:
DEFINITION 1 A stochastic demand correspondence d is a rule assigning, to every
price-income situation (p;w), one subadditive and monotone function d(p;w) : P ! [0;1]
-where P denotes the class of all subsets of the budget set B(p;w)-, with d(p;w)(?) = 0
and d(p;w)(B(p;w)) = 1. We shall also use the abbreviated term SDC.
We recall that subadditivity means d(p;w)(A1 [ ::: [ Ap) 6
Pp
i=1 d(p;w)(Ai) for any
A1;:::;Ap µ B(p;w), and monotonicity means d(p;w)(A) 6 d(p;w)(B) if A µ B µ
B(p;w).
Our motivation for such concept, that is illustrated in Example 1 below, goes as fol-
lows. A common argument for the use of demand (or choice) correspondences is that
they serve to model the ¯rst step in a multistep procedure aiming at selecting one single
bundle (see e.g. Aizerman and Aleskerov [1]). That is: if c denotes our classical de-
mand correspondence, then c(p;w) would produce a subset of B(p;w) -say, any number
of available bundles with which we would be most satis¯ed- and subsequent steps would
end in a ¯nal decision among them. This suggests the following digression. Any subset
5of the budget set can be assigned a binary \satisfaction value" under c: that is, we write
c(p;w)(A) = 1 if A meets c(p;w), and c(p;w)(A) = 0 otherwise. The interpretation is
plain: A o®ers \full" satisfaction if it contains anything optimal (so that the ¯nal deci-
sion is to be made \at full satisfaction"), and \void" satisfaction if no optimal element
is available among A. Observe that, with this interpretation in mind, subadditivity and
monotonicity are quite natural though additivity is not any more. Correspondingly, af-
ter that abstraction process, for any d stochastic demand correspondence we are led to
interpret that d(p;w)(A) re°ects the probability that A contains at least one bundle that
could potentially be demanded by the consumer (recall the possible multiplicity of the
optimal bundles as presented above). Any such assignement must be naturally monotone
and subadditive though not necessarily additive, as Example 1 will illustrate.
It is clear that deterministic demand correspondences -DDC henceforth- are degenerate1
SDC through the standard identi¯cation explained above. Due to the de¯nition of a
measure, any SDF is SDC. Besides, we must admit that the term \stochastic" as is
applied to SDC's may seem misleading since there are not probabilities in De¯nition 1.
Nonetheless, we shall keep it for homogeneity.
We say that the stochastic demand correspondence d satis¯es the weak axiom of stochas-
tic revealed preference (WASRP) if, for all price-income situations (p;w), (p0;w0), and for
every A µ B(p;w) \ B(p0;w0): d(p;w)(A [ (B(p;w) n B(p0;w0))) > d(p0;w0)(A).
OBSERVATION 1 We observe that if d was in fact SDF, then the de¯nition coin-
cides with that given by Bandyopadhyay et al., since A \ (B(p;w) n B(p0;w0)) = ? and
thus we would have
d(p;w)(A [ (B(p;w) n B(p
0;w
0))) = d(p;w)(A) + d(p;w)(B(p;w) n B(p
0;w
0)))
In [2, pp. 100-101] they o®er an explanation of the intuition underlying WASRP in
the SDF realm. Also, the manuscript "`Regular' choice and the weak axiom of stochastic
revealed preference" by Dasgupta and Pattanaik explores the relation between this postulate
for rational choice behavior and regularity. The latter is kind of a stochastic version of
Cherno®'s condition -as they explain in their Remark 2.6- and thus it is a very weak
rationality property of stochastic choice.
3 Aggregating stochastic demand correspondences
Suppose now that we have d1;:::;dm SDC's associated with each of a ¯nite number n of
agents, and that there are known, pre¯xed ±1;:::;±n strictly positive and summing up to
1. We shall explain below possible interpretations of these key amounts, that depend on
the original context. Then, we introduce the following:
1For this we mean that, for each (p;w), there is A µ B(p;w) such that d(p;w)(B) = 1 whenever
A \ B 6= ?, and d(p;w)(B) = 0 whenever A \ B = ?
6DEFINITION 2 The stochastic demand correspondences d1;:::;dn induce the stochas-
tic demand correspondence d associated with ±1;:::;±n, according to:
d(p;w)(A) = ±1d1(p;w)(A) + ::: + ±ndn(p;w)(A)
for all A µ B(p;w).
The fact that d is SDC is immediate. It is also plain that when in particular the di's
are stochastic demand functions then d is SDF as well. In this Section we analyse some
properties of the stochastic demand correspondences (or functions) that carry over to their
aggregate stochastic demand correspondence de¯ned as above. The main property of this
construction is Proposition 1 below. Before stating it, we explicit a simple example that
illustrates De¯nitions 1 and 2:
EXAMPLE 1 In a competitive situation with 2 agents consuming 2 goods, their re-
spective demand behaviors are given {for any positive price and non-negative income{ by
the following demand correspondences:
1. d1((p1;p2);w) = f( w
p1;0);(0; w
p2)g
2. d2((p1;p2);w) = f( w
2p1; w
2p2)g
The SDC associated with d1 is given by the expression: for any A µ B(p;w),
d1((p1;p2);w)(A) =
½
1 if ( w
p1;0) 2 A or (0; w
p2) 2 A
0 otherwise




p1;0)g [ f(0; w








The stochastic representative consumer associated with the society (±1 = ±2 = 1
2) will be
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p1;0) 2 A or (0; w




2 if ( w
2p1; w
2p2) 2 A and ( w
p1;0) 62 A and (0; w
p2) 62 A
1 if ( w
2p1; w
2p2) 2 A and [either ( w
p1;0) 2 A or (0; w
p2) 2 A]
0 otherwise
for any A µ B(p;w), irrespective of p and w.
PROPOSITION 1 For any list of stochastic demand correspondences (respectively:
functions) d1;:::;dn that satisfy WASRP and any choice of ±1;:::;±n strictly positive and
summing up to 1, the stochastic demand correspondence (respectively: function) d associ-
ated with them satis¯es WASRP.
7Proof. We consider the SDC case. Fix price-income situations (p;w), (p0;w0), and












Now, because each di satis¯es WASRP,





which ends the proof for the case of demand correspondences. The SDF case is alike. ¥
Interpretations and consequences of the property exposed in Proposition 1 vary with
the setting that originates the construction. In general, the functional form is easier to
explain and we focus on that case for expository convenience.
Bandyopadhyay et al. [3, Proposition 3.2 (i)] is a valuable result stating that the
stochastic aggregate of a ¯nite number of deterministic demand funcions satisfying WARP
ful¯ls WASRP even though this does not preclude that the classical (deterministic) ag-
gregate demand fails to satisfy WARP. In their model, the primitive demand functions
are classical (i.e., each one associates, with each price-income situation, a bundle: the
basket of commodities demanded by the corresponding agent). This is a degenerate case
of stochastic demand functions, after a certain identi¯cation process is performed (cf. [2,
Remark 2.3] and [3, Remark 2.2]). Also, through that standard identi¯cation, asking the
demand functions to satisfy WARP means exactly that their stochastic counterparts ful¯l
WASRP (cf. [3, Remark 2.4]). Thus [3, Proposition 3.2 (i)] is encompassed in Proposition
1, where ±i = 1
n for all i and the di's are standard demand functions upon the afore-
mentioned identi¯cation. Likewise, we can deduce a deterministic statement for classical
demand correspondences.
REMARK 1 For those who intend to link this model to the rationalizability achieve-
ments in Falmagne [8] and Barberµ a and Pattanaik [5], the next alternative construction
may clarify some points while capturing the same conceptual meaning.
As in [3], suppose d1(p;w);:::;dn(p;w) are standard demand functions. Let us de¯ne
c(p;w) = fd1(p;w);:::;dn(p;w)g, whose cardinality is at most n. We construct the fol-
lowing probability assignment e d(p;w) over c(p;w) -cf. [5, De¯nition 2.1]-, given by:
e d(p;w)(a) =
jfi : a = di(p;w)gj
n
The concept represented by d as in [3, De¯nition 3.1], and therefore through De¯ni-
tion 2, can be identi¯ed with that captured by this probability assignment over c(p;w).
Notice that d(p;w)(A) =
P
a2A\c(p;w) e d(p;w)(a) for all A µ B(p;w), because the di's are
univalued.








0)(a) ¡ e d(p;w)(a))
for all A µ B(p;w) \ B(p0;w0).
The case where we aggregate demand correspondences through De¯nition 2 permits to
answer the next question: What kind of representative consumer could we associate with
a society whose members have multivalued demands? In our proposal, any stochastic de-
mand correspondence d representing such collective captures in d(p;w)(A) the proportion
of members in the society that have at least one satisfactory bundle of B(p;w) in A.
We are aware that on occasions the construction in De¯nition 2 could be explained by
splitting each di in an adequate number of ¯ctitious deterministic members of a collective
the di represents, and then de¯ning d through the procedure laid down in Bandyopadhyay
et al. [3]. However, the restrictions to proceed in this alternative way are by no means
trivial. A very signi¯cant one arises from [3, Footnote 5]: any stochastic demand function
de¯ned by aggregation of a ¯nite number of standard demand functions must take rational
values only. In other words: if, for example, we have as primitive components of a demand
model some stochastic demand functions that permit the probability of demanding some
bundle in a ¯xed A to vary continously with prices and/or wealth, then that decomposition
procedure can not be conducted succesfully.
In order to end this Section we shall produce yet another statement in the line of
Proposition 1. In Corollary 1 below we analyze the rendering of our aggregation proposal
with regard to some other normative properties. We need some previous notation.
Following Bandyopadhyay et al. [4, De¯nition 2.4 (ii)], we say that the SDF d is
tight if d(p;w)(A) = 1, where A = fx 2 B(p;w) : px = wg. Thus, a DDF satis¯es
Walras' law exactly when the degenerate SDF that is identi¯ed with it is tight. Besides,
aggregating tight SDF's produces a tight SDF. The stochastic role of the Compensated
Law of Demand (CLD henceforth, or Samuelson's inequality in the terminology of [4]) is
played by the following concept: the tight SDF d satis¯es Stochastic Substitutability if for
all price-income situations (p;w), (p0;w0) and for every A µ fx 2 Rm












+ : px = w; p
0x < w
0g) + d(p;w)(A)
Then, we recall that [4, Claim 3.3] establishes that, for tight DDF's, CLD/Samuelson's
inequality is equivalent not only to WARP (Mas-Colell et al. [9, Proposition 2.F.1]) but
also to Stochastic Substitutability (under the usual identi¯cation).
COROLLARY 1 For any list of tight stochastic demand functions d1;:::;dn that sa-
tisfy Stochastic Substitutability and any choice of ±1;:::;±n strictly positive and summing
up to 1, the stochastic demand function d associated with them satis¯es Stochastic Substi-
tutability as well. In particular: the stochastic aggregate of a ¯nite number of deterministic
demand functions that satisfy Walras' law plus CLD satis¯es Stochastic Substitutability.
9Proof. The ¯rst statement admits an immediate direct proof. Or, alternatively: it
holds because Stochastic Substitutability is equivalent to WASRP for any tight SDF ([4,
Proposition 3.4]), and Proposition 1 ensures that WASRP carries over to the stochastic
aggregate. Then, because the stochastic aggregate is forcefully tight, we use the same
equivalence to prove that it satis¯es Stochastic Substitutability.
As for the deterministic instance 2, we just recall that, for tight DDF's, CLD is equi-
valent to Stochastic Substitutability. ¥
4 WASRP and the representability by stochastic or-
derings
A focal result in Bandyopadhyay et al. [2] is their Proposition 3.5, where it is ensured that
rationalizability by stochastic orderings -i.e., the possibility of explaining the primitive de-
mand behavior through the optimality procedure that would have used a stochastically
rational agent to derive her demand- implies WASRP. As we recalled in the Introduction,
its importance lies on the role that such fact assigns to WASRP: if a certain stochastic
demand behavior is to be considered rational, that axiom is mandatory. In this Section we
address ourselves to such issue and extend it to the SDC setting conveniently, which con-
stitutes a direct argument for establishing WASRP as a signi¯cant rationality restriction
on stocahstic demand behavior in the SDC setting too.
Following [2, De¯nition 3.2], we de¯ne T as the set of all orderings (re°exive, connected,
transitive) on Rm
+. Also, T(G;H) will denote the set of all orderings in T that possess a
unique greatest element in G and it belongs to H. Then, the stochastic demand function
d is rationalizable by stochastic orderings (RSO) if there is a probability measure r on the
set of all subsets of T such that
d(p;w)(A) = r(T(B(p;w);A))
for each possible (p;w) and A µ B(p;w).
For reasons that are related to the general structure of our SDC concept, it seems
unavoidable to introduce the following extended version of the RSO concept, whose in-
terpretation is similar to that of RSO.
DEFINITION 3 Let T 0(G;H) denote the set of all orderings in T whose greatest
elements in G exist and intersect H. Then, a stochastic demand correspondence d is
weakly rationalizable by stochastic orderings (WRSO) if there is a probability measure r
on the set of all subsets of T such that d(p;w)(A) = r(T 0(B(p;w);A)) for each possible
(p;w) and A µ B(p;w).
2The particular case cited in Corollary 1 is all but a particularization of [3, Proposition 3.2 (i)].
Observe that both the primitive demand functions exhaust the income and their stochastic aggregate is
tight, and that, under such restrictions, WARP is equivalent to CLD -primitive level- while WASRP is
equivalent to Stochastic Substitutability -aggregate level.
10It is clear that any RSO stochastic demand function is a WRSO stochastic demand cor-
respondence. Moreover, notice that r in De¯nition 3 satis¯es 1 = r(T 0(B(p;w);B(p;w)))
for all possible (p;w). We shall return to this relevant fact after proving our next result.
In order to fully grasp the reach of De¯nition 3, it pays to explicit what to be stochas-
tically rational means in our general setting. Our rational agent is presumed to have
a collection of orderings on Rm
+ at his disposal. When he has to decide what he ¯nds
satisfactory for prices p and available income w he selects one of them according to a
probability distribution r. Such ordering forcefully has at least one maximal element in
B(p;w), and possibly more. If he assigns to each collection of feasible options A µ B(p;w)
the probability that it contains one such \demanded" bundles, what he thus derives is a
stochastic demand correspondence. Conversely then, a given SDC is considered (weakly)
rational if it is possible to explain it through that precise procedure.
Thus, and following this discussion, now we are in a position to prove a fact that
establishes the WRSO concept as a sensible rationality property of stochastic demand
behavior:
PROPOSITION 2 Any WRSO stochastic demand correspondence satis¯es WASRP.
Proof. Let d denote the SDC under inspection. By assumption, there is a certain
probability measure r that justi¯es its WRSO condition.
The following derivation will be mostly useful, also regarding intuitive interpretations
of the proof. For any B = B(p;w), denote NB = T n T 0(B;B). Such subset is formed
by the collection of all orderings on Rm
+ without maximal elements in B. The fact that
1 = r(T 0(B(p;w);B(p;w))) yields r(NB) = 0.
In order to check that WASRP holds under such circumstances, let us ¯x price-income
situations (p;w), (p0;w0), and A µ B(p;w) \ B(p0;w0). We need to prove d(p;w)(A [





0(B(p;w);A [ (B(p;w) n B(p
0;w
0)))
For convenience, we use the shorthands B = B(p;w) and B0 = B(p0;w0)
Pick <2 T 0(B0;A). By de¯nition, there is a 2 A such that a < x for all x 2 B0. Two
cases arise: either <2 NB, or <2 T 0(B;B). In this second case, where there is a maximal
element b in B, forcefully <2 T 0(B;A [ (B n B0)). Indeed, if b 2 B n B0 this is obvious.
Otherwise, b 2 B \ B0, but then a < b and therefore < has a maximal element on B,
namely a, that belongs to A.
The digression above shows that T 0(B0;A) µ NB [T 0(B;A[(B nB0)). This yields the
desired inequality. ¥
The introduction of the NB subsets has a plausible motivation and it is backed by a
clear intuition. If the agent would only consider orderings that have maximal elements on
every budget set, a determinant inclusion T 0(B0;A) µ T 0(B;A[(BnB0)) would be reached
in a straightforward manner. However, taking T as it was proposed in the literature forces
11us to deal with two di®erent types of orderings: those with some maximal element on B,
which are selected almost surely, and those without any maximal bundle, which happen
with null probability. This technical handicap is probably unnecessary because it could
be overcome through the use of an adapted WRSO/RSO concept (i.e. taking T as the set
of all orderings on Rm
+ with a greatest element on every possible budget set instead) that
is normatively equivalent to the original one. We would obtain a result (only super°uosly)
weaker than the Proposition above but as we have argued, it would lose none of its essence
while producing a gain in intuition and clarity of exposition.
In order to close this Section, we deduce from Proposition 2:
COROLLARY 2 (Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta and Pattanaik) Any RSO stochas-
tic demand function satis¯es WASRP.
Proof. Immediate. The stochastic demand function ful¯ls WRSO and therefore WASRP.
Recall that despite the di®erent formal statement, WASRP means the property of stochas-
tic demand functions that Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta and Pattanaik had de¯ned (cf. Ob-
servation 1). ¥
OBSERVATION 2 There seems to be an inaccurate statement in the proof of Bandy-
opadhyay et al. [2, Proposition 3.5], which does not a®ect the truth of the enunciate as
proven above. These authors give an argument aiming at showing that:





(E denotes B(p;w)\B(p0;w0)). Such statement is false, and examples are easy to provide.
The reason is that there is the implicit assumption that every ordering in T(B(p;w);EnA)
has a greatest element in B(p0;w0), which is incorrect under RSO. To put it shortly:
nothing prevents an ordering in T(B(p;w);E n A) from having no greatest element in
B(p0;w0) at all. This di±culty is overcome through the use of the adapted RSO concept
we mentioned before. Anyway, not only their Proposition 3.5 derives from Proposition
2 above but in fact it is possible to modify the original proof given by Bandyopadhyay,
Dasgupta and Pattanaik suitably and keep the property that is really needed, namely:





for each possible (p;w) and A µ B(p;w) \ B(p0;w0). We just need to check that







which holds because r is ¯nitely additive and both T(B(p;w);E n A);T(B(p0;w0);A) and
T(B(p0;w0);A);T(B(p0;w0);B(p0;w0) n A) are pairs of disjoint subsets. Indeed, a short
argument proves the ¯rst disjointness, and the second one is plain. Actually, that second
inequality holds with equality: the de¯nition of RSO forces r(T(B(p0;w0);B(p0;w0))) = 1.
125 The rationalizability of the aggregate of rational
stochastic demands
In this Section we shall be concerned with a topic that seems to have been understudied.
We focus on a group of agents whose demands are \stochastically rational" -the appro-
priate notion is related to the exact form of their respective demand correspondences.
Then, moving up to studying their \total demand", we shall infer that the same property
can be expected of their stochastic representative agent. As we have argued before, such
behavior can be labelled as no less than unexpected due to the discouraging antecedents
in the classical literature.
PROPOSITION 3 For any list of stochastic demand correspondences (respectively:
functions) d1;:::;dn that are WRSO (respectively: RSO) and any choice of ±1;:::;±n
strictly positive and summing up to 1, the stochastic demand correspondence (respectively:
function) d associated with them is WRSO (respectively: RSO) too.
Proof. We consider the SDC case ¯rstly. There exists a list of probability measures ri
on the set of all subsets of T such that di(p;w)(A) = ri(T 0(B(p;w);A)) for each possible
(p;w) and A µ B(p;w). Let r be the probability measure on the set of all subsets of
T given by r(S) =
Pn
i=1 ±iri(S) for all S µ T. It is then a simple routine to check
that d(p;w)(A) = r(T 0(B(p;w);A)) for each possible (p;w) and A µ B(p;w), since that





The SDF case is analogous. ¥
The next Corollary is highly relevant by comparison with the outcome that produces
the deterministic setting.
COROLLARY 3 The stochastic representative agent of a society where everyone de-
rived his/her demand function from an ordering is RSO.
Its importance lies in the fact that the classical aggregate consumer associated with
this society might be non-derivable from an ordering, an issue that poses hard di±culties
to the analysis of aggregate behavior. Nonetheless, even in such case we can guarantee
that its stochastic representative agent is rationalizable by a stochastic ordering with a
precise form.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that a sensible concept of stochastic demand correspondence can be used
to generalize the concept of stochastic demand function. We also proved that if a number
of (individual or representative) consumers display stochastic demand correspondences
that satisfy (the extended variation of) WASRP, then their aggregation by a certain
13sensible stochastic demand correspondence satis¯es it too. Moreover, it those agents
are \stochastically rational" then so is their aggregation by such stochastic demand cor-
respondence. As a consequence, other aggregability properties of the construction are
obtained: particularly, we deduced a Corollary that extends to the stochastic realm the
classical deterministic result that the Compensated Law of Demand is an aggregable re-
striction when the agents always exhaust their income. Thus, gathering classical and
original statements, one has: given any ¯nite number of standard demand functions that
satisfy Walras' law and CLD, their deterministic aggregate always satis¯es CLD and their
stochastic aggregate always satis¯es Stochastic Substitutability. Under a weaker ratio-
nalizability restriction than the RSO used by Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta and Pattanaik,
stochastic demand correspondences ful¯l WASRP. This reinforces the relevance of the
extended version of WASRP that we have proposed as an unavoidable requirement for
rational stochastic demand behavior. We also argued in favour of a normatively equiva-
lent notion of what to be stochastically rational means. It is our view that adopting such
variation helps to educate one's intuition as far as proofs are concerned.
We can brief a good part of our results in one sentence: as long as a full analysis of
stochastic demand is available, its application to aggregate behavior seems to overturn
many of the handicaps that the deterministic case poses.
Besides, although it is out of the scope of this work, we point out that the interested
reader may ¯nd it challenging to check that many of these achievements can be exported
to an abstract setting, i.e. to a choice framework that is not necessarily linked to the
restrictions of demand theory.
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